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Mandamus for Zoning Appeals
James Jay Brown*
The statutory action in mandamus should not be emasculated of its proper function by too narrowly construing the
legislative prerogative of original conception. Restrictive
generalization of the function of the writ of mandamus cannot become the absolute criterion of its proper application to
the particular facts in each case.'

T

in its two-fold intent, succinctly identifies a
current dilemma and offers a method of correction. With
the passage of chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code, the legal
profession in Ohio has been confused as to whether the writ of
mandamus is the most effective tool for challenging and reversing
a rejection for a building permit by a municipal zoning officer or
board. Doubts as to its use have become solidified because of
the negative results obtained in several cases which relied upon
this writ. In an attempt to comprehend the future use of mandamus for zoning appeals, an analysis will be made of its past use
in relation to its effectiveness under Chapter 2506 of the Revised
Code.
Function
HIS STATEMENT,

Mandamus can be identified through definition 2 and exemplary function. Where an individual has his own special
interest to enforce or protect, independent of those interests
which he holds in common with others, he may resort to mandamus in order to enforce or protect such rights.3 He may resort
* B.Sc., Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, Univ. of Penna.; Second-year student at Cleveland-Marshall Law School.
I State, ex rel. Cubbon, Jr. v. Winterfeld, 104 Ohio App. 260, 148 N. E. 2d
523 (1957).
2 ,,... mandamus is a writ which issues from a court of superior jurisdiction, and is directed to any private or municipal corporation of any of
its officers, or to an executive, administrative or judicial officer, or to an
inferior court, commanding the performance of a particular act therein
specified, and belonging to his or their public, official, or ministerial duty,
or directing the restoration of the complainant to rights or privileges of
which he has been illegally deprived." 2 Yokley, Zoning Law and Practice,
Sec. 194, p. 15 (2d ed. 1953).
"Mandamus is a writ, issued in the name of the state to an inferior tribunal,
a corporation, a board, or person, commanding the performance of an act
which the law specially enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust,
or station." Ohio Rev. Code (1953), Sec. 2731.01. See also State, ex rel.
Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried, 163 Ohio St. 469, 56 Ohio Ops. 397, 127
N. E. 2d 371 (1955).
8 55 C. J. S., Mandamus, Sec. 47.
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to mandamus to compel zoning officials to perform duties defined
by valid statutes or ordinances. 4 The writ has been deemed
applicable in several situations:
1. To compel action on the part of an officer or body
where it is claimed that such officer or body has wrongfully
refused to exercise the power which resides in him or it.
2. To review the action of the officer where no other
method of review is available.
3. To test the validity of a zoning restriction where the
action of the officer is predicated solely upon the prohibitions
of the ordinance.5
Mandamus may compel the issuance of a building permit
where the relator can show that the position and office casts upon
the municipal officer or body a duty to comply with said request. 6
The writ will lie where it can be proven that the administrative
criteria, established by statute or ordinance, by which an officer
or board judge the adequacy of the anticipated improvement
within the zoning restrictions, was inadequate. 7 It has been successfully used where a court held that an arbitrary and unduly
long period of time, in which a zoning board of appeals held up
a relator's petition without deciding upon it, amounted to a denial.8 If relator's building application is refused under the terms
of a zoning ordinance previously declared invalid, mandamus
will lie. 9 This right to challenge the validity of a zoning ordinance
4 101 Id., Zoning, Sec. 345.

5 2 Rathkopf and Rathkopf, Law of Zoning and Planning, 68-4 (3rd ed.
1960).
6 State, ex rel. Voad Hachinuch Hacharedi v. Baxter, 148 Ohio St. 221, 74
N. E. 2d 242, dism. 332 U. S. 827, 68 S. Ct. 209 (1947). See also State, ex rel.
The Ice and Fuel Co. v. Kreuzweiser, Inspr., 120 Ohio St. 352, 166 N. E. 2d
193, 228 (1929); State, ex rel. Gaede v. Guion, 117 Ohio St. 327, 158 N. E.
748 (1927); State, ex rel. Moore Oil Co. v. Dauben, 99 Ohio St. 406, 124
N. E. 232 (1919), rev. Columbus, ex rel. Moore Oil Co. v. Dauben, 28 Ohio
C. A. 281 and Moore Oil Co. v. Dauben, 30 CD 480; Selby, Auditor v. State
of Ohio, ex rel. Smiley, 63 Ohio St. 541, 59 N. E. 218 (1900); State, ex rel.
Adams v. Pendleton, 100 Ohio App. 1, 59 Ohio Ops. 443, 135 N. E. 2d 458
(1955).
7 State, ex rel. Associated Land and Investment Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst, 168 Ohio St. 289, 154 N. E. 2d 453 (1958).
8 State, ex rel. Del Monte v. Woodmansee, Comm'r., 47 Ohio L. Abs. 513,
72 N. E. 2d, 789 (1946),-four month delay without hearing.
9 State, ex rel. Geletka v. City of Campbell, 66 Ohio L. Abs. 300, 113 N. E.
601, dism. 157 Ohio St. 553, 106 N. E. 2d 83 (1952).
See also, C. J. S. op. cit. supra, n. 4 at Sec. 346; Ordinance ruled unconstitutional: Lucas v. State, ex rel. Abt, 21 Ohio L. Rep. 363; 33 ALR 287 n.
(1923); State, ex rel. Cadwallader v. Village of Antwerp, 104 Ohio App.
109, 146 N. E. 2d 877 (1957).
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through a proceeding in mandamus has been variously recognized. 10 By far, the writ's most frequently utilized function has
been to attack the justification of zoning ordinances. Mandamus
has been permitted where the zoning regulations have borne no
reasonable relation to the promotion of public health, safety,
morals, convenience, or general welfare."
Under the terms of the Ohio Statute, Section 2731.01,12 the
writ was granted in compelling the issuance of a permit where a

city building commissioner attempted to expand an interpretation
and application of a restrictive ordinance. 13 If the relator has
complied with all of the requirements of a zoning ordinance, including that of building setback, mandamus is ruled effective,
even though he may not have complied with requirements of the
C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 4 at 1177.
C0
11 State, ex rel. Enverard v. Miller, Inspector, 98 Ohio App. 283, 129 N. E. 2d

209 (1954). See also Women's Kansas City St. Andrew Society v. Kansas
City, 58 Fed. 2d 593 (CCA 8, 1932); State, ex rel. Voad Hackinuch Hacharedi v. Baxter, supra, n. 6; Pritz v. Messer, 112 Ohio St. 628, 149 N. E. 30
(1925); City of Youngstown v. Kahn Bros. Building Co., 112 Ohio St. 654,
148 N. E. 842, 43 ALR 662 (1925); McCloud v. Woodmansee, 165 Ohio St.
271, 59 Ohio Ops. 298, 135 N. E. 2d 362 (1956); L. & M. Investment Co. v.
Cutler, 125 Ohio St. 12, 180 N. E. 379, 86 ALR 707 (1932); State ex rel.
Shafer v. Ohio Turnpike Commission, 159 Ohio St. 581, 50 Ohio Ops. 465,

113 N. E. 2d 14 (1953); Mehl v. Stegner, Dir., 38 Ohio App. 416, 175 N. E.
712 (1930); Partain v. City of Brooklyn, 101 Ohio App. 279, 1 Ohio Ops.
2d 263, 133 N. E. 2d 616 (1956); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Village of Brooklyn,
92 Ohio App. 351, 49 Ohio Ops. 422, 110 N. E. 2d 440 (1952); State, ex rel.
Cook v. Turgeon, 84 Ohio App. 287, 50 Ohio L. Abs. 45, 77 N. E. 2d 283 (1947);

Nectow v. City of Cambridge, 277 U. S. 183, 72 L. ed. 842, 48 S. Ct. 447

(1928).
For Preservation of Constitutional Rights see: Hauser v. Erdman, 113
Ohio St. 662, 150 N. E. 42 (1925); State, ex rel. Gaede v. Guion, supra, n. 6;
State, ex rel. Ice and Fuel Co. v. Krenyweiser, supra,n. 6; Bauman v. State,
ex rel. Underwood, 122 Ohio St. 269, 171 N. E. 336 (1930); State, ex rel.
Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, 138 Ohio St. 259, 34 N. E. 2d 777, 136
ALR 840 (1941); State, ex rel. Castle National Inc. v. Village of Wickliffe,
80 N. E. 2d 200, Ct. of Appeals, Lucas County (1947); dism. 148 Ohio St. 410;
74 N. E. 2d 270 (1947); State, ex rel. The Synod of Ohio of United Lutheran
Church in America v. Joseph, 139 Ohio St. 229, 39 N. E. 2d 515, 138 ALR

1274 (1942); State, ex rel. Prentke v. Village of Brookpark, 107 Ohio App.
325, 79 Ohio L. Abs. 540, 153 N. E. 2d 677 (1958).

If a case may be determined upon any other theory than that of the
constitutionality of a challenged statute, no consideration will be given to
the constitutional question: Rucker v. State, 119 Ohio St. 189, 162 N. E. 802
(1928); State, ex rel. Herbert v. Ferguson, Aud., 142 Ohio St. 496; 52 N. E.
2d 980 (1944); Wiggins v. Babbitt, 130 Ohio St. 240, 198 N. E. 873 (1935);
Village of Strongsville v. McPhee, 142 Ohio St. 534, 53 N. E. 2d 522 (1944);
State, ex rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake, 154 Ohio St. 412, 96 N. E. 2d
414 (1951); American Cancer Society Inc. v. City of Dayton, 160 Ohio St.
114, 114 N. E. 2d 219 (1953).
12 Ohio Rev. Code, supra, n. 2.
Is State, ex rel. Moore Oil Co. v. Dauben, supra, n. 6.
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zoning board. 14 However, where an appeal is taken in order to
get permission for conversion of use of part of a building, which
use was not specifically identified in the terms of the original
permit, mandamus has been denied. 15

Procedure and Pleading
Utilization of mandamus has resulted in certain procedural
methods which define, somewhat, the scope of the writ. Upon
the relator is placed the burden of generally pleading and proving these issues: that there is no plain and adequate remedy in
the ordinary course of the law, including equitable remedies;
that there has been a gross abuse of discretion on the part of the
officer or agency; that the relief sought is not merely to determine a controversy of a strictly private nature.' 6 Allen Fonoroff
of Cleveland has suggested that in such zoning cases the issue
resolves itself into one of reasonableness. It is the relator's task
to prove that no public interest is being served and that the zoning of his land bears no substantial relation to the purpose of the
zoning ordinance.' 7 Direct attack upon the reasons for and application of the comprehensive zoning plan, where such case
exists, will go to the essence of relator's problem.' 8 Where he
attacks the validity of an ordinance, he has the burden of showing this by clear and satisfactory evidence. 19
In his process of pleading the writ of mandamus, petitioner
should not look to the court to pass upon the wisdom and judgment of the legislatively enacted ordinance or statute, for this
is outside of the court's purview. Its function is to determine
whether or not an ordinance is sufficiently and reasonably comprehensive in its applicability and bearing upon the preservation
of health, safety, morals, and general welfare.2 0 Where he does
State, ex rel. Adams v. Pendelton, supra, n. 6. See also 2 Metzenbaum,
The Law of Zoning, 853 (2d ed. 1955).
15 State, ex rel. Euclid-Doan Building Co. v. Cunningham, 97 Ohio St. 130,
119 N. E. 361, LRA 1918 D 700 (1918).
16 State, ex rel, Libbey-Owens-Ford Glass Co. v. Industrial Commission of
Ohio, 162 Ohio St. 302, 123 N. E. 2d 23 (1954).
17 29 Fordham L. Rev. 693, 702 (1961).
14

18

Id. at 705.

19 State, ex rel. Cook v. Turgeon, Comm'r., 84 Ohio App. 287, 50 Ohio L.
Abs. 45, 77 N. E. 2d 283 (1947).
20 State, ex rel. Jack v. Russell, Comm'r., 162 Ohio St. 281, 123 N. E. 2d
261 (1954); Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 166 Ohio St. 509, 144 N. E. 2d 177
(1957).
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invoke the court's power to declare the ordinance unconstitutional he must plead and prove that he has sustained, or is close to
sustaining, a direct injury from the enforcement. 21 Unless it can
be shown that there has been a clear abuse of legislative power
in enacting the subject ordinance, the court will not substitute
its judgment for that of the legislature's where the validity of
the zoning purpose is fairly debatable. 22 Under the terms of
Section 2731.03 of the Ohio Revised Code, 23 mandamus will not,
in any way, control or compel the court's exercise of judicial
discretion. 24 When the relator chooses to attack the ordinance
upon constitutional grounds, the respondent cannot demur to
such a petition.

25

Conditions Precedent
A. Generally
To become entitled to apply for the writ of mandamus, the
relator must comply first with all requirements in the ordinance
(i.e., forms, permits, plans, building lines, etc.) .26 Where such
building plans and specifications conform to state and city building codes, and there is no contrary or restrictive zoning ordinance in force at that time, the writ will lie to compel issuance.
Once relator has shown full compliance under the ordinance, the
duty cast upon the officer or board is purely ministerial and
28
mandamus will issue to compel performance of this duty.
In State, ex rel. Wiegel v. Randall, Dir.,29 relator church had
complied with all procedural steps under the existing ordinance,
Annot., 136 A. L. R. 1378, 1380.
State, ex rel. Cook v. Turgeon, Comm'r., supra, n. 19.
23 "The writ of mandamus may require an inferior tribunal to exercise its
judgment, or proceed to the discharge of any of its functions, but it cannot
control judicial discretion."
24 State, ex rel. De Ville Photography, Inc. v. McCarrol, Judge, 167 Ohio
St. 210, 4 Ohio Ops. 2d 268, 147 N. E. 2d 254 (1958).
25 State, ex rel. Gaddis v. City of Oakwood, 49 N. E. 2d 956 (Ct. of Appeals,
Montgomery County 1942).
26 State, ex rel. Adams v. Pendleton, supra, n. 6. See also C. J. S., op. cit.
supra, n. 9. Compliance with conditions precedent.
27 Hauser, Comm'r. v. State, ex rel. Erdman, supra, n. 11. See also, State,
ex rel. The Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, Dir., supra, n. 11; where compliance with all ordinance requirements, grounds for denial held unreasonable and discriminatory; Village of Ottawa v. Odenweller Milling Co., 57
Ohio App. 170, 13 N. E. 2d 144, 136 A. L. R. 850 n. (1936).
21
22

28

C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 9.

29

160 Ohio St. 327, 116 N. E. 2d 200 (1953).
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which permitted church construction in the desired location.
Upon being refused a permit, it resorted to mandamus. Because
all conditions precedent under the ordinance were fulfilled, the
permit was granted.
In another instance, the petitioner failed to submit his final
plans and specifications to a city zoning commission after receiving conditional approval for a building permit. Mandamus was
30
held to be ineffectual under this set of circumstances.
Where the submission of plans and specifications proves to be
a financial hardship, and an unnecessary expense, although one
of the procedural requirements in the zoning ordinance, the
relator need not submit plans and specifications in order to prove
3
the validity of his petition. 1
B. Clear Legal Right
The condition precedent of clear legal right is a specific facet
of the right to use mandamus. 32 Such right may arise from
statute. 33 It will also arise when the petitioner seeks to establish
a use in a residential area which does not substantially and
permanently injure the appropriate uses of neighboring property, 34 or a use in a location not subject to a present and definite

municipal plan or zone.35 In a case where the relator sought to
erect a gasoline station upon land zoned retail, a clear legal
right was established when the respondent could not show a
definite municipal use for or eminent domain proceeding upon
the subject property.36 Religious institutions have established
clear legal right by showing that a municipal ordinance provided
State, ex rel. The Ice and Fuel Co. v. Krenyweiser, supra, n. 6.
State, ex rel. The Killeen Realty Co. v. City of East Cleveland, 169 Ohio
St. 375, 160 N. E. 2d 1 (1959) (Syllabus 2).
32 C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 9.
33 Ohio Rev. Code, supra, n. 2; see also: State, ex rel. Voad Hachinuch
Hackaredi v. Baxter, supra, n. 6; Selby, Auditor v. State of Ohio, ex rel.
Smiley, supra, n. 6; C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 3, Sec. 157.
34 State, ex rel. Voad Hackinuch Hacharedi v. Baxter, supra, n. 6.
35 Henle v. City of Euclid, 97 Ohio App. 258, 56 Ohio Ops. 39, 118 N. E.
2d 682, 125 N. E. 2d 355, dism. 162 Ohio St. 280, 55 Ohio Ops. 151, 122 N. E.
2d 792 (1954). See also: State, ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, 164
Ohio St. 265, 130 N. E. 2d 336 (1955).
36 State, ex rel. Sun Oil Co. v. City of Euclid, ibid.; see also: State, ex rel.
Dille Laboratories Corp. v. Woditsch, 106 Ohio App. 541; 7 Ohio Ops. 2d 318,
156 N. E. 2d 164 (1958); the municipality has no power or authority to
appropriate lands for some contemplated future use-City of Cincinnati v.
Vester, 281 U. S. 439, 50 S. Ct. 360 (1930).
30
31
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for or did not specifically exclude such a use in a residential
zone. 37 A religious institution established its right by proving
that compliance with the zoning ordinance was in violation of
its Constitutional Rights 38 (i.e., Article I, Sections 1 and 19 of the

Ohio Constitution, and Article XVI, Section 1 of the United
States Constitution).
In many cases the proof of a clear legal right may be controlled by the peculiar location and neighborhood of the property.
If the petitioner can prove that property adjacent to or within
close proximity to his lot has been improved in the identical
manner in which he anticipates improvement, then mandamus
may become his appropriate remedy. Relator, in State, ex rel.
Rosenthal v. Bedford,39 seeking a permit for a filling station, was
successful with mandamus by showing (1) that his corner lot
was a busy intersection where two of the four corners were
being used presently as filling stations and (2) that there was
little probability that the lot would be utilized as zoned, residentially, since there had been previous acquisitions of the lot
for highway and utility purposes. State, ex rel. Prentke v.
Village of Brookpark40 presented the situation of a residentially
zoned lot fronting on a heavily traveled highway, used in large
part by trucks from the surrounding industrial area. The court
held the ordinance to be arbitrary, unreasonable and confiscatory,
and allowed the change.
State, ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggeneier, 97 Ohio App.
67, 115 N. E. 2d 65 (1953). See also: State ex rel. The Synod of Ohio of
United Lutheran Church in America v. Joseph, supra, n. 11.
38 Young Israel Organization of Cleveland v. Dworkin, 105 Ohio App. 89,
133 N. E. 2d 174 (1956). See also: Preservation of Constitutional Rights,
supra, n. 11; private individual property rights guaranteed under the
constitution-State, ex rel. Geletka v. City of Campbell, supra, n. 9.
In Village of Ottawa v. The Odenweller Milling Co., supra, n. 27, Syllabus
1, the Court of Appeals upheld the relator's clear legal right where it found
that the ordinance prohibiting the issuance of the building permit was "an
unreasonable and discriminatory regulation having no substantial relation
to the public health, morals, safety, or public welfare." Although relator's
appeal was under mandatory injunction, court dictum stated that writ of
mandamus could also have been used.
39 74 Ohio L. Abs. 425, 134 N. E. 2d 727 (1956). See also: State, ex rel.
Husted v. Woodmansee, Comm'r, 86 Ohio L. Abs. 121, 169 N. E. 2d 655
(1960); Injunctive relief to overcome restrictions which substantially decrease value: Curtis v. City of Cleveland, 170 Ohio St. 127, 10 Ohio Ops. 2d
85, 163 N. E. 2d 682 (1959).
40 Supra, n. 11.
37
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C. Acts in Excess of Authority
Acts of refusal by municipal officers or boards which are in
derogation of the powers invested in such officers or boards,
ordinarily present sufficient grounds for mandamus. The statutes
and ordinances from which such powers are derived will be
strictly construed and cannot be extended to include limitations
which originally were never clearly prescribed. 41 When such
statutes or ordinances fail to lay down sufficient guidelines or
criteria by which zoning officers or boards may exercise these
vested powers, mandamus will lie to challenge such acts which
appear to be outside of these powers. 42 It should be noted that
where the relator files his writ of mandamus under a newly
enacted temporary zoning ordinance, instituted pending the
completion of an area zoning plan, his writ may be denied. For
43
the law in force at the time the writ was taken out governs.
This is true, also, where a petition is filed following the suspension of a zoning ordinance. 44 However, under the laws in
force at that time, mandamus will not issue where it is positively
shown that no right can be enforced or wrong possibly
remedied.

45

Some acts in excess of legally vested authority arise from
abuses of discretion. 46 An important case in this area is State,
ex rel. The Killeen Realty Co. v. City of Cleveland.47 Although
State, ex rel. Gulf Refining Co. v. DeFrance, 89 Ohio App. 1, 45 Ohio
Ops. 315, 100 N. E. 2d 689 (1950). See also: State ex rel. Moore Oil Co. v.
Dauden, supra, n. 6; State, ex rel. The Ice and Fuel Co. v. Krenyweiser,
supra, n. 6; State, ex rel. Husted v. Woodmansee, Comm'r., supra, n. 39.
42 State, ex rel. Associated Land and Investment Corp. v. City of Lyndhurst,
supra, n. 7; see also: State, ex rel. Selected Properties, Inc. v. Gottfried,
supra, n. 2; Cassell v. Lexington Township Board of Zoning Appeal, 163
Ohio St. 340, 127 N. E. 2d 11 (1955); State, ex rel. The Ice and Fuel Co. v.
Krenyweiser, supra, n. 6; C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 4, Sec. 349.
43 State, ex rel. The Ice and Fuel Co. v. Krenyweiser, supra, n. 6. See also:
Hauser, Comm'r. v. State, ex rel. Erdman, supra, n. 11; State, ex rel. Gaede
v. Guion, supra, n. 6; Bauman v. State, ex rel. Underwood, Dir., supra, n. 11;
State, ex rel. Fairmount Center Co. v. Arnold, supra, n. 11; Contra: Ordinance in effect at time application for permit taken out governs-Gibson
v. City of Oberlin, 171 Ohio St. 1, 12 Ohio Ops. 2d 1, 167 N. E. 2d 651 (1960);
C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 4, Sec. 346.
44 State, ex rel. Gaede v. Guion, supra, n. 6.
45 State, ex rel. Ray v. Klein, 88 Ohio App. 237, 44 Ohio Ops. 426, 99 N. E.
2d 326 (1950). See also: State, ex rel. Apple v. Penze, 137 Ohio St. 569,
575, 31 N. E. 2d 841 (1941); State, ex rel. Stoer v. Raschig, Dir., 141 Ohio St.
477, 49 N. E. 2d 56 (1943); State, ex rel. Rhinehart v. Celebrezze, Dir., 147
Ohio St. 24, 67 N. E. 2d 776 (1946).
46 C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 4, Sec. 346.
41

47 Supra, n. 31.
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relator's land was zoned for apartment use, it was surrounded
on three sides by commercial-retail zones and on the fourth by a
railroad track. The only means of ingress and egress for the
proposed shopping center was over another's land. The court
found that by failing to grant relator's permit, his land could
not be economically utilized in relation to the surrounding development. 48 Mandamus compelled the permit to be issued because, under the particular circumstances, the refusal was an
abuse of discretion. Such abuse may be found where municipal
officials exercise their legislative function in an arbitrary, una
reasonable and unlawful manner. For such acts do not bear
49
reasonable relation to the exercise of the delegated powers.
D. Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies
The usefulness of mandamus has slowly been limited through
the evolvement of stare decisis and enactment of statute. The
condition precedent, that the relator must exhaust his administrative remedies before resorting to mandamus, 50 was recognized
in court dictum in 1927.51 A later case stated the identical condition is found in State, ex rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake."3
tion. 52 The leading Ohio Supreme Court decision on this con53
dition is found in State, ex rel, Lieux v. Village of Westlake.
Herein, the relator was denied use of the writ of mandamus because he had not taken his appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals
before resorting to the courts. The Supreme Court felt that
such a step would have given relator the relief requested. Then
in 1953, the Ohio Legislature enacted Chapter 2731 of the Re54
vised Code, which specifically defined this condition.
In those instances where all administrative remedies have
been exhausted, the courts have granted leave to rely upon manDeclaratory judgment to compel permit where lot not economically
usable-Krom v. City of Elmhurst, 8 Ill. 2d 104, 133 N. E. 2d 1 (1956).
49 Schlagheck v. Winterfeld, 108 Ohio App. 299, 9 Ohio Ops. 2d 277, 161
N. E. 2d 498 (1958). See also: C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 3 at Sec. 156.
50 Yokley, op. cit. supra, n. 2, Sec. 180, at 457. See also C. J. S., op. cit. supra,
n. 4, Secs. 334 and 347.
51 State, ex rel. Gaede v. Guion, supra, n. 6.
52 Cleveland Trust Co. v. City of Cincinnati, 62 Ohio App. 139, 23 N. E. 2d
450 (1939).
53 154 Ohio St. 412, 96 N. E. 2d 414 (1951).
54 "The writ of mandamus must not be issued when there is a plain and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the law." Sec. 2731.05.
48
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damus. 55 Where the relator has fulfilled the condition precedent,
he has not forfeited his right to question the constitutional validity of the ordinance through mandamus.5 6 But to make such
an attack justified, the available remedies must have been exhausted. 57 Regardless of whether constitutionality is an issue,
either in a township 58 or a city,5 9 resort to the available administrative remedy, usually a board of appeals, 60 is important.
Illustrative of the extent of such appeals is State, ex rel. Ricketts v. Balsly.6 1 Relator operated a mobile home site on a portion
of his land, such use being termed non-conforming under the
existing zone. Seeking to transform the use to conforming, he
petitioned the Hamilton County Rural Zoning Commission in
1952 and the Hamilton County Board of Zoning Appeals in 1953.
Obtaining two rejections, he took his petition to the Court of
Common Pleas, which granted his prayer. But when he attempted to enlarge his trailer park in 1959, he could not get a
building permit or zoning certificate. Relator took his petition
to court immediately, without following the once-tried administrative appeals. The court held against his writ of mandamus,
holding that he had a plain and adequate remedy as defined by
statute.
An exception to the exhaustion of remedies is to be found in
State, ex rel. Cubbon Jr. v. Winterfeld.6 2 Here, the relator established a clear legal right to the issuance of a permit of occupancy. The Court of Appeals of Lucas County ruled in favor
of the writ of mandamus, stating that the petitioner did not have
55 The Young Israel Organization of Cleveland v. Dworkin, supra, n. 38;
State, ex rel. Anshe Chesed Congregation v. Bruggenmeier, supra, n. 37.
56 State, ex rel. Lieux v. Village of Westlake, supra, n. 53.
57 Pfeiffer v. Graves, Secretary of State, 88 Ohio St. 473, 104 N. E. 529
(1913); City of Cincinnati v. Hillenbrand, 103 Ohio St. 286, 133 N. E. 556 (1921); State, ex rel. Kittel, a Taxpayer v. Bigelow, 138 Ohio St. 497, 37
N. E. 2d 41 (1941); Belden v. Union Central Life Insurance Co., 143 Ohio
St. 329, 55 N. E. 2d 629 (1944).
58 State, ex rel. Iaus v. Carlton, 168 Ohio St. 279, 60 Ohio Ops. 485, 154 N. E.
2d 150 (1958).
59 State, ex rel. Ronald, Inc. v. City of Willoughby, 170 Ohio St. 39, 9 Ohio
Ops. 2d 386, 161 N. E. 2d 890 (1959). See also: State ex rel. Grant Se. v.
Kiefaber, 171 Ohio St. 326, 14 Ohio Ops. 2d 3, 170 N. E. 2d 848 (1960); State,
ex rel. Heights Jewish Center v. Haake, Ohio App. 8th District, dism. 165
Ohio St. 547 (1956).
60 Metzenbaum, op. cit. supra, n. 14, at 847.
61 112 Ohio App. 555, 171 N. E. 2d 538, affd. 171 Ohio St. 553, 173 N. E. 2d
117 (1960).
62 104 Ohio App. 260, 4 Ohio Ops. 2d 407, 148 N. E. 2d 523 (1957).
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to exhaust his remedies where they were a cumbersome method
of administrative appeals which did not afford an adequate legal
remedy.

63

Although specific cases make no reference to present statute,
those which do have held for strict compliance under their terms.
Section 2731.0104 was interpreted to deny mandamus where the
relator had not exhausted his remedies. 6 5 Section 2731.0560 was
a singlethe ground for refusing the writ where relator sought
67
zone.
industrial
limited
a
in
permit
family dwelling
Important exceptions to such strict compliance have been
found where the relator can attack the constitutionality of the
law, ordinance, or regulation,6" or he can establish a clear legal
right to the issuance of the permit. 69 If such a right can be proved
as a matter of fact and of law, the court70 will issue a peremptory
writ of mandamus in the first instance.
Chapter 2506
The enervation of the writ of mandamus was made more
nearly complete on September 16, 1957 by the passage into law of
Chapter 2506 of the Ohio Revised Code. The essence of this
statute provides for appeals from decisions of any agency of any
political division, (i.e., officer, tribunal, authority, board, bureau,
71
commission, department, etc.), to the Court of Common Pleas.
The authority of the Common Pleas Court to hear cases of
zoning appeal from lower administrative boards has been affirmed
in Kolker v. Morr.72 The appellate court followed the statutory
terms, stating that Common Pleas has jurisdiction to hear such
cases on their merits, but that such appeal is "in addition to any
C. J. S., op. cit. supra, n. 4, Sec. 347.
Ohio Rev. Code, supra, n. 2.
65 State, ex rel. Ians v. Carlton, supra, n. 58; State, ex rel. Grant v. Kiefaber, supra, n. 59.
63
64

66 Ohio Rev. Code, supra, n. 53.

State, ex rel. Ronald Inc. v. City of Willoughby, supra, n. 59.
State, ex rel. Vielhauer v. Leighton, 111 Ohio App. 227, 14 Ohio Ops. 2d
160, 171 N. E. 2d 748 (1959).
69 State, ex rel. Trusz v. Village of Middleburg Heights, 112 Ohio App. 87,
82 Ohio L. Abs. 481, 163 N. E. 2d 778 (1960).
70 Sec. 2731.06 of Rev. Code; State, ex rel. Gulf Refining Co. v. DeFrance,
67
68

supra, n. 41.
71

Ohio Rev. Code, Sec. 2506.01.
Ohio App. 300, 14 Ohio Ops. 2d 178, 165 N. E. 2d 469 (1959).

72 111
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other remedy of appeal provided by law," 73 (i.e., appeals to
inferior administrative tribunals). If such inferior tribunal refuses to hear relator's appeal, Common Pleas may be resorted to
74

directly.

Cases controlled by this statute show mandamus being
denied use for zoning appeals. In State, ex rel. Fredrix v. Beachwood, 75 relator was denied a permit to erect a commercial structure upon a residentially zoned lot. His resort to mandamus was
hopeless because under the terms of Chapter 2506, he had a precise method of appeal which he failed to utilize. Relator's petition, in State, ex rel. Gund Co. v. Solon 7 stated that the prevailing zoning ordinance was invalid because it was arbitrary
and unreasonable and, for this reason, appeal from the zoning
commissioner's refusal would be useless. Once again the court
ruled that the statutory remedy was adequate; mandamus denied.
In the extremely comprehensive case of State, ex rel. Trusz
v. Village of MiddleburgHeights, 77 appeal from an adverse permit
decision was denied because the court (1) could not find that
the relator had a clear legal right to the remedy sought through
mandamus, and (2) did find that he had an adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of statutory procedure, (i.e., Sections
2506.01 to 2506.04). Relator's procedural error was in resorting to
mandamus, following an unsuccessful appeal to the Board of Zoning Appeals, when he should have appealed to Common Pleas.
The adequacy of the legal remedy would have been impaired only
where a clear legal right to the permit is established or the relief
would be unreasonably delayed in the processes of appeal. The
court cited Eggers v. Morr,78 which states that a mere inconvenience in complying with the prescribed administrative steps
of appeal does not amount to a valid excuse for resorting to another remedy. Taken together, it appears that the adequacy of
the available legal remedy cannot be loosely construed.
One possible exception, on the appellate level, must be noted
73 "The appeal provided in sections 2506.01 to 2506.04, inclusive, of the Revised Code is in addition to any other remedy of appeal provided by law."
Supra, n. 71.
74 Shaker-Coventry Corp. v. Shaker Hts. Planning Commission, 86 Ohio
L. Abs. 47, 16 Ohio Ops. 2d 432, 176 N. E. 2d 332 (1961).
75 171 Ohio St. 343, 14 Ohio Ops. 2d 12, 170 N. E. 2d 847 (1960).
76 171 Ohio St. 318, 13 Ohio Ops. 2d 444, 170 N. E. 2d 487 (1960).
77 Supra, n. 69.
78 162 Ohio St. 521, 55 Ohio Ops. 417, 124 N. E. 2d 115 (1955).
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from a citation in the Trusz Case. State, ex rel. Cubbon, Jr. v.
Winterfeld79 involved Sections 519.12 and 519.19 of the Ohio Revised Code, which prescribes zoning appeal procedure in townships. These statutes are identical in administrative procedure
with Chapter 2506, giving jurisdiction for appeals to the Court
of Common Pleas. The relator proved his clear legal right to the
issuance of a certificate of occupancy, and the court granted
relief through mandamus. They stated ".

.

. that where a clear

legal right is shown, the provisions for such cumbersome appeals
(under Sections 519.12 and 519.19) do not constitute an adequate
remedy at law."

80

If the method of appeals under these sections is an inadequate remedy, what kind of a remedy does Chapter 2506 provide?
Conclusion
At this time the future of mandamus for zoning appeals must,
of necessity, remain cloudy and uncertain. From its original
unlimited utility, the writ has become useful in only limited
circumstances. Under Sections 2731.06 and 2506.01, of the Ohio
Revised Code, and Ohio Supreme Court decision, mandamus
cannot be utilized where the administrative remedies have not
been exhausted, or a clear legal right not established. The few
cases where mandamus was allowed under current statutory
restriction have only been tried at the appellate level. The exceptions involve a challenge of the constitutionality of an ordinance, or a showing of a clear legal right. The section above,
entitled Condition Precedent, presents many instances of the use
of the writ, but such instances have been untested against the
current statutes.
Whether such procedural remedies, as defined by statute, are
desirable has not been questioned in this work. But the extent
of time involved in pursuing a private claim for a permit has not
been overlooked. If, in order to finally resort to mandamus, the
relator must go through all administrative steps, much time and
money will have been exhausted, which may defeat any justifiable right originally possessed. A reduction in administrative
8*
procedure may become desirable.
79

Supra, n. 1.

80

State, ex rel. Cubbon Jr. v. Winterfeld, supra, n. 1, at 264.
Fonoroff, Problems in Zoning Administration, 33 Ohio Bar 783 (1960).

81
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